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THE ETHICS BEHIND EFFICIENCY 
  
“All that I had intended… was that [economists] might better realise the exact 
connection between the normative and the positive, and that their practice as 
political philosophers might be made thereby more self-conscious.” 
--Lionel Robbins (1938, 640). 
 
In this article, I address a longstanding issue in economics: how should we evaluate economic 
outcomes and public policies? Lionel Robbins, who helped usher in the modern era of 
neoclassical economics, implores economists in the quote above to be more careful about the 
distinction between facts and values, and be more “self-conscious” about the use of normative 
elements disguised as science. This concern still applies today. Modern textbook writers strive to 
teach a fairly homogenous view of neoclassical microeconomics, one in which there is consensus 
on how economic welfare is defined, and generally use the term “efficiency” as if it were a 
scientific discovery, rather than a normative construction. 
I seek to demonstrate first that discussions about efficiency and goals involve normative 
considerations; second, that students should be trained to consider multiple economic and social 
goals; third, that in discussing public policies many textbooks use the Pareto concept of 
efficiency when they should apply Kaldor-Hicks efficiency; fourth, that the moral defense of 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency requires the existence of supportive institutions, and that the absence of 
such institutions limits the scope for normative analysis in certain contexts; and last, that 
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considerations of duty and virtue ethics underlie the support of markets and policy-based 
efficiency recommendations. 
Critical thinking by students about public policy would seem to require that they probe 
normative debates about how welfare ought to be measured, what version of efficiency is 
relevant to a particular policy question, and how non-consequentialist moral frameworks are 
needed to resolve some difficulties; further, students should become adept at combining the best 
positive and normative foundations to arrive at recommendations for political economy. In short, 
adopting a pluralist approach engages students in important debates and may better serve the 
goals of a liberal education. Some of these arguments are developed more fully in Colander and 
McGoldrick (2009) and Wight (2015). 
NORMATIVE DIMENSIONS OF PARETO EFFICIENCY 
Textbook writers have a Herculean task of covering many subjects, and nuances often have to be 
omitted; this is a given. At the same time, the basics should be covered clearly. One basic 
distinction that all textbooks address is between positive and normative economics. Yet many 
texts fail to follow this distinction when presenting discussions about economic efficiency and 
public policy. Efficiency is a concept arising out of, and defended by, normative arguments. 
Calling something “efficient” requires that one place the highest value on a pre-selected goal, 
and such a choice is driven by values. Once a goal is selected, the determination of efficiency 
can entail scientific measurements. The scientific features should not obscure the normative 
nature of the undertaking. 
In philosophy, teleology is the study of ends or purposes. In modern language we simply 
call this outcome-based or consequentialist ethics. Economists as policy advisers are generally 
outcome-based ethicists because they focus on outcomes as the nexus of choice, both for 
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individuals and policy makers. Within an appropriate normative context, this is a desirable and 
powerful approach. However, this method should be limited to situations in which the underlying 
institutional context is ethically defensible on non-consequentialist grounds, as discussed in later 
sections. 
The discovery that failing to reach a market equilibrium can, under specific assumptions, 
result in “waste” is one of the premier findings of microeconomics. It is an astute insight that if 
an authority prevents the market from trading more than 3 units of a product (when equilibrium 
occurs at 5 units), this intervention produces a gap between what consumers would be willing 
and able to pay, and what sellers would be willing and able to sell, for marginal units. Allowing 
the sale of the 4th and 5th units would produce gains in what economists call the economic 
surplus, gains that in theory come at no cost to others provided that the market clearing price 
reflects true opportunity costs. The inability to carry out voluntary transactions in this 
circumstance produces a deadweight loss to both producers and consumers. This fact is 
noteworthy and important in the evaluation of public policies. 
It is a short step from here to Pareto’s definition of efficiency, namely, a state in which all 
voluntary trades have been exhausted, and it is not possible to make anyone better off without 
causing involuntary harm to someone else. For illustrative purposes, table 1 shows the results of 
surveying eight popular principles textbooks to see what they reveal about the treatment of 
efficiency and normative economics. In particular, the context in which efficiency is introduced 
is examined to see whether students are alerted to the normative aspects of this discussion. Every 
textbook but one defines efficiency in terms of Pareto efficiency (the exception is Colander, who 
presents efficiency more broadly as achieving desired ends). Five of the eight textbooks treat the 
subject of efficiency as a matter of science rather than one employing normative values. 
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It is not surprising that economics teachers are confused on this issue. Vilfredo Pareto 
and Arthur Pigou, who led the development of neoclassical welfare economics in the early 20th 
century, were positivists who equated knowledge with empirical measurement. Economic 
welfare must therefore be “that part of social welfare that can be brought directly or indirectly 
into relation with the measuring rod of money” (Pigou 1962, 11). They tried to choose words that 
sounded scientific rather than value-laden to convey their ideas. Pareto, to avoid using “utility” 
coined the term “ophelimity” to represent relative satisfaction; Pigou preferred “desiredness” 
because “it cannot be taken to have any ethical implication” (ibid.). However, converting all 
welfare considerations into dollar equivalents imparts the “ring of factual propositions...[that] are 
likely to obscure the evaluations implied” (Bergson 1938, 327–28). 
The promotion of efficiency as a scientific concept succeeded among many economics 
teachers, except those who opened up the hood to peer inside at the engine. David Friedman 
(1986, 347) notes that economists “claim to be positive scientists yet frequently use normative-
sounding words.” Lionel Robbins (1981, 7) laments that “The name conveys an impression of 
value-free theory which it should be just our intention to avoid.” Kenneth Arrow suggests that 
the confusion on nomenclature is deliberate, because ultimately economists are interested in 
persuasion: 
A definition is just a definition, but when the definiendum is a word already in common 
use with highly favorable connotations [efficiency], it is clear that we are really trying to 
be persuasive; we are implicitly recommending the achievement of optimal states (1963, 
942). 
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As noted by McCloskey (1998), Coase (1994), and others, persuasion is an important feature of 
the way science progresses in practice, and thus the division between positive and normative 
economics is necessarily blurry. 
The selling of efficiency as a scientific concept, rather than a normative one, arises from 
at least three misconceptions: 
1. Settled consensus issue. The consensus argument is that once a critical mass of 
economists agrees to adopt a particular version of welfare theory, it therefore becomes an 
“objective” part of the disciplinary canon. This is certainly true for debates about positive 
phenomena, such as why demand curves generally slope downwards. Agreement on a normative 
issue, however, merely implies the existence of shared moral norms, and the implicit values 
operating out of view do not go away. A moral norm flying under the radar can be an 
impediment to critical thinking by students. Reinhardt (2010) notes that, “[W]hen economists 
wax mushy on the virtue of what they call ‘efficiency,’ it is time to run for the hills, for they are 
selling a preferred moral doctrine in the guise of science.” 
In The Nature and Significance of Economic Science, first published in 1932, Lionel 
Robbins promotes the idea of the positive/normative split. The science part of economics has to 
do with factual phenomena only, and Robbins makes clear in a later essay that this does not 
include welfare or efficiency considerations, which are “not warranted by anything which is 
legitimately assumed by scientific economics” (1981, 4–5). This does not preclude economists 
from analyzing the economic surplus and making ethical claims for its maximization. Indeed, 
Robbins says, “it is greatly to be desired that economists should have speculated long and widely 
on [normative and ethical] matters….” (1945, 150). Such “political” economy is a necessary part 
7 
of a liberal education that stresses critical thinking, as long as instructors are clear that they are 
doing a mix of positive and normative analyses. 
2. Quantification is value-free. While the dollar calculation of an economic surplus is 
value-free, it acquires importance only after economists add a normative interpretation—that 
economic behaviors reflect the rational pursuit of preference satisfaction, that satisfying 
preferences enhances human welfare, and that the goal of an economic system is to maximize 
welfare defined as preference satisfaction. Such evaluations require both facts about the surplus 
and explicit values that place preference satisfaction over other economic goals. 
Quantifiability is not a unique attribute of efficiency theory. Alternative “objective” 
calculations relating to human welfare have been constructed, such as the Human Development 
Index (HDI) or the Gini coefficient of inequality. If economists present information on the size 
of the economic surplus as one factor affecting economic welfare, that is quite different from 
asserting that (by definition) the economic surplus is synonymous with economic welfare. 
For many of the reasons elaborated above, Amartya Sen argues that economic efficiency 
is an incomplete and therefore superficial measure of evaluation. He notes that “An economy can 
be optimal in [the Pareto] sense even when some people are rolling in luxury and others are near 
starvation.... In short, a society or an economy can be Pareto-optimal and still be perfectly 
disgusting” (1970, 22). By judging economic performance only on the basis of dollar votes cast, 
economists operate in a “barren informational landscape” (Sen 1995, 7). 
3. Specialization justifies ethical myopia. A final misconception is that economists have 
little to say about ethics and can ignore the subject, confident that the normative consensus about 
efficiency is all an economist need know. David Friedman (1986, 347), for example, argues that: 
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As an economist, I have no expertise in good and bad. I can, however, set up a “criterion 
of goodness” called efficiency.... One could object that the economist, defining efficiency 
according to what questions he can answer rather than what questions he is being asked, 
is like the drunk looking for his wallet under the streetlight because the light is better 
there than where he lost it. The reply is that an imperfect criterion of desirability is better 
than none. 
Friedman rightly notes the “imperfect” nature of this criterion and its normative foundations, and 
would presumably be open to thoughtful deliberation and debate, even though he claims to have 
no expertise. As noted earlier, the economic (scientific) point of view was not meant to stifle 
ethical discussion, because moral discourse is vital for public policy analysis. Robbins insists 
that “[B]y itself economics affords no solution to any of the important problems of life. I agree 
that for this reason an education which consists of [positive] economics alone is a very imperfect 
education.” (1945, ix). 
It is also incorrect to argue that economists have little to learn from or contribute to the 
study of ethics or human welfare, given the large number of Nobel Prize winners in economics 
who have explored such topics (a partial list would include Samuelson, Arrow, Myrdal, Hayek, 
Friedman, Simon, Buchanan, Solow, Coase, Fogel, Selten, Harsanyi, Sen, Stiglitz, Kahneman, 
and Ostrom). It may be more accurate to say that many economists need help in learning the 
tools of ethical analysis. Adam Smith, who promoted the advantages of specialization, also noted 
its main defect, that it promoted ignorance (1776/1981, 506). Robbins’ quote at the start of this 
article seems applicable, that economists should be more self-conscious about their use of 
normative concepts. Efficiency remains a normative concept despite attempts to portray it as 
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science, and notwithstanding the lack of awareness as to its ethical foundations. For elaboration 
of these issues, and the ones below, see Hausman and McPherson (2006) and Wight (2015). 
MULTIPLE ECONOMIC OUTCOMES 
In light of these considerations, a possible way for teachers to proceed is to draw students into 
this debate, pointing out that any evaluation of outcomes involves a mix of positive and 
normative elements, and that the preference satisfaction view of efficiency is one of several bits 
of evidence about well-being. This approach is pluralist, getting students to recognize that more 
than a single outcome measure is needed to understand human well-being. It also recognizes that 
efficiency should always be understood within a wider normative framework of policy analysis. 
For example, students may wish to examine cases in which satisfying preferences might 
cause a fall in welfare (think of the drug addict), preferences may be polluted through 
advertising, consumers may not always be rational, or other gaps in the standard welfare model. 
These are important topics within the “political economy” framework envisioned by Robbins, 
and generate classroom excitement that enhances critical thinking. One example would be to ask 
students to evaluate the attempt by the New York City Board of Health to ban super-sized soft 
drinks, which relies on the claim that consumer welfare is improved when choice options are 
reduced. 
One textbook ancillary that promoted such a pluralist outcomes-approach was by Rendigs 
Fels and Stephen Buckles, Casebook of Economic Problems and Policies: Practice in Thinking 
(1981). The authors take it as de rigueur that critical thinking requires that students in each and 
every case explore the multiple kinds of outcomes produced by public policies. Ultimately, 
students must rely on their own normative values as to whether the goal of efficiency trumps 
other worthy goals in policy evaluation. A similar approach is found in the “prudent 
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pragmatism” of William Bluhm and Robert Heineman, Ethics and Public Policy: Methods and 
Cases (2007). 
Virtually all principles textbook writers admit that there are other economic goals that 
count besides maximizing the economic surplus, such as equity, growth, stability, freedom, and 
so on. Often, textbook writers switch between goals without even recognizing that doing so 
requires changing the normative standard by which outcomes are evaluated. For example, 
textbooks typically report that market competition generates efficient outcomes under the right 
circumstances. When discussing monopoly, however, textbook authors approvingly discuss 
patent protection that promotes innovation and discovery. Endorsing a patent monopoly involves 
a normative thought process that goes something like this: innovation is good because it provides 
consumers in the future with better products and services, satisfying preferences that don’t exist 
in the present. The deadweight losses generated by a patent monopoly hurt current consumers, 
but the expected gains to future consumers should be weighted more heavily than current 
losses—even though there is no scientific basis by which to calculate what future consumers will 
gain (because these products do not even exist). A patent monopoly is thus justified not by the 
Pareto efficiency test, but by faith in the setting of rules that may, over the long course of history, 
produce good results. The moral framework is “rule consequentialism” rather than “act 
consequentialism” and the goal is dynamic efficiency rather than static efficiency. 
But what moral argument justifies privileging future generations over the present 
generation in this way? This is not a matter of science but of ethics. Becker and Elias (2007), in 
analyzing a proposal to create a market for kidney transplants, similarly change the normative 
goal from one of static efficiency to one of saving the most lives, without discussion or defense. 
If it is acceptable to pick and choose goals without debate, this should reinforce the notion that 
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efficiency cannot be a purely scientific concept, but belongs firmly in the realm of normative 
political discourse. 
Still, textbook writers seem wedded to the notion of efficiency as a purely positive 
technical concept. Frank and Bernanke admit that “efficiency is not the only goal” in society, but 
they nevertheless assert, as if it were scientific truth, that “efficiency should be the first goal” of 
public policy, because being economically efficient “enables us to achieve all our other goals to 
the fullest possible extent” (2009, 179, emphasis added). The claim that efficiency is in fact the 
only good outcome seems to rely on a magical alchemy that can transform the economic surplus 
into any other desirable outcome at no cost. Likewise, Krugman and Wells state that “What is 
important for economists, however, is always to seek to use the economy’s resources as 
efficiently as possible in the pursuit of society’s goals, whatever those goals may be.” (2012, 15, 
emphasis added). 
But is “efficiency” as economists define it always desirable in the pursuit of other goals? 
The answer is perplexing, because the different aspects of efficiency may clash with other goals 
of society. Laws that require truck drivers to take mandatory rest breaks reduce the productive 
efficiency of motor carriers (miles driven per hour of labor input), yet serve the goal of public 
safety. Likewise, laws banning child labor in mines raise production costs. Safety and productive 
efficiency cannot both be prioritized, or, said differently, society sometimes lowers productive 
efficiency in order to achieve other goals. It is impossible to even identify a production 
possibility frontier curve without first considering the institutional and moral context under 
which production takes place (e.g., the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1940 mandates a 40-hour 
workweek). These are relatively easy points for teachers to address by noting that we should 
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strive for productive efficiency within the changing institutional rules of society (Colander 2017, 
29). 
The problem of maximizing allocative efficiency “whatever” the other social goals may 
be is not so easy to overcome. A doctor swears a Hippocratic oath to put patient interests ahead 
of all other interests. Typically, this implies saving the most lives possible given scarce 
resources. Suppose a doctor has a limited supply of blood that could be used to save the lives of 
two children, or, alternatively, to save the life of one elderly billionaire. What should the doctor 
do? Saving the most lives (or most life-years extended) would dictate using the blood for the 
children. But allocative efficiency does not mean “saving the most lives” but rather putting 
resources to the use of people who value them most. This means using the blood for the 
billionaire who bids up the price. Medical efficiency and economic efficiency are not 
complementary goals in this short-run example because distributional considerations matter. In A 
Critique of Welfare Theory (1950), Ian Little argues that for any policy change to be labeled as 
welfare-enhancing, a necessary condition should be that it produce a not-unfavorable 
redistribution of income.1 
To summarize, arguing that economic efficiency automatically “enables us to achieve all 
our other goals to the fullest possible extent” fails to properly distinguish between normative 
goals and the trade-offs that exist. The Case, Fair, and Oster textbook addresses this 
appropriately: 
In talking about general equilibrium in the beginning of this chapter, we continue our 
exercise in positive economics—that is, we seek to understand how systems operate 
without making value judgments about outcomes. Later in the chapter, we turn from 
positive economics to normative economics as we begin to judge the economic system. 
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Are its results good or bad? Can we make them better? In judging the performance of any 
economic system, you will recall, it is essential first to establish specific criteria by which 
to judge (2012, 254). 
They further note that “Economists who ask explicitly normative questions should be required to 
specify their grounds for judging one outcome superior to another” (2012, 10). 
 
EFFICIENCY AND PUBLIC POLICY 
Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency 
The Pareto version of efficiency is rarely of use in public policy debates for the well-recognized 
reason that changes to existing institutions or policies always cause harm to some, making Pareto 
improvements impossible. In the 1930s, Nicholas Kaldor (1939) and Sir John Hicks (1939) 
attempted to resolve the Pareto problem by reformulating the definition of welfare. Instead of the 
goal being the actual satisfaction of consumer preferences, the new goal became the capacity to 
satisfy consumer preferences. In this rendition, not everyone needs to gain from a policy change, 
as long as the winners gain more than the losers lose. While compensation to losers is a 
theoretical possibility, Hicks notes that this rarely happens in practice: 
Every simple economic reform inflicts a loss upon some people; the reforms we have 
studied are marked out by the characteristic that they will allow of compensation to 
balance that loss, and they will still show a net advantage. Yet when such reforms have 
been carried through in historical fact, the advance has usually been made amid the clash 
of opposing interests, so that compensation has not been given, and economic progress 
has accumulated a roll of victims, sufficient to give all sound policy a bad name” (Hicks 
1939, 711). 
He goes on to state: 
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I do not contend that there is any ground for saying that compensation ought always to be 
given; whether or not compensation should be given in any particular case is a question 
of distribution, upon which there cannot be identity of interest, and so there cannot be any 
generally acceptable principle” (ibid.) 
Compared to Pareto’s approach, the Kaldor-Hicks version of efficiency involves 
government coercion (threatening to punish economic agents if they do not conform) or 
compulsion (using force to compel particular actions). In both cases, losers from a policy change 
are not voluntarily choosing the policy change. What are the reasons or circumstances in which it 
is morally acceptable to force others to take an action against their own wills? This is a difficult 
topic in moral philosophy, and surely beyond any concept of positive science. Robbins, 
previously cited, hones in on this problematic aspect: “Thus both as regards utility and liberty we 
are eventually involved in questions relating to the coercive powers of government and the basis 
of consent” (1981, 9). 
There are many ways of addressing this in class, such as through playing a John Rawls’ 
Game, in which students explore how institutional rules or policies could arise behind “the veil 
of ignorance” (Wight and Morton 2007, 161–76). This is not to endorse Rawls, because there are 
noted weaknesses in this approach, but the experience gets students thinking about the important 
issue of voluntary consent. Another approach that takes little time is to quiz students about what 
they think are the moral justifications for the existence of a state and for citizens to provide their 
consent to being governed. What evolves might be something like this: one gives voluntary 
consent to being part of a social compact, believing that bound together there will be welfare and 
security gains that, over the generations, will make it worthwhile. 
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One example to use in class is the Mayflower Compact, an agreement signed in 1621 by 
early settlers to Massachusetts facing famine and other calamities. On the eve of going ashore 
they agreed that they: 
do by these presents solemnly and mutually in the presence of God and one of another, 
Covenant and Combine ourselves together in a Civil Body Politic, for our better ordering 
and preservation and furtherance of the ends aforesaid; and by virtue hereof to enact, 
constitute and frame such just and equal Laws, Ordinances, Acts, Constitutions and 
Offices from time to time, as shall be thought most meet and convenient for the general 
good of the Colony…. (Plimoth Plantation n.d.).2 
In making a social compact one acknowledges that some of the time one might be required to do 
things one would prefer not to do, but this is acceptable provided there are basic institutional 
guarantees of individual rights. Governments use coercion (the threat of force) all the time to 
achieve policy goals, such as in maintaining law and order and reducing crime. Intimidating 
crooks is done to promote greater freedom for most other citizens. Even so, a criminal has 
inviolate rights, such as to a fair judicial process, a trial by peers, no self-incrimination, no cruel 
punishment, and so on. Hence, the justification for coercion and compulsion does not rest solely 
on the good outcomes that are envisioned; it is intricately bound up with rules and duties and the 
process by which the rules of coercion and compulsion are derived and implemented. 
Using this line of reasoning, one could argue that coercion as an economic policy tool can 
be ethically justified in certain institutional contexts, say if we are living in a democratic society 
with a fair legal system, clear property rights, low transactions costs for defending property 
rights, and basic rights of assembly, free speech, and so on. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency and the 
compulsion it implies is a difficult concept to defend in many parts of the world where these 
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institutional pre-conditions are tenuous or nonexistent. This would not be news to economists 
trained in earlier generations. Here is how Frank Knight put it: 
It is well to state explicitly at the outset that the society considered in this essay is the 
sovereign democratic state, that is, a modern Western nation, where law is made and 
enforced by a responsible government within the context of representative institutions. 
(1960, 19). 
By the late 20th century, however, more and more students have been taught that economic 
efficiency is a scientific construct, applicable as physics or mathematics to any society anywhere 
in the world. Lant Prichett, working under Chief Economist Larry Summers at the World Bank, 
wrote an ironic (and ultimately embarrassing) memorandum that illustrates the problem with this 
belief. Using standard efficiency reasoning, Pritchett sarcastically proposed that polluting 
factories in the United States should be outsourced to poorer countries in Africa. Because both 
incomes and life expectancies are lower in that region, “the economic logic behind dumping a 
load of toxic waste in the lowest wage country is impeccable and we should face up to that” 
(cited in Hausman and McPherson 2006, 12–13, emphasis added). 
The logic is indeed impeccable, but the normative social compact that would justify 
coercion and compulsion has not been examined. Some people in Africa would be involuntarily 
harmed, even as others gain jobs and higher incomes. How are the injured to seek redress? Many 
African citizens have little voice to give consent due to limited property rights, they cannot vote 
in fair elections, and they cannot make good judgments about environmental risks and costs 
because of the censored flow of information in public media. No independent judiciary is 
available to address grievances, and those who protest such a rigged system face intimidation 
and violence. In short, the ethical justification for harming some citizens to generate higher 
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rewards for others rests on institutional foundations that are questionable in many parts of world. 
Summers later apologized: “When I make a mistake, it’s a whopper” (Rosenberg 2001). 
The Kelo case 
Even if compensation is paid, consent may still be absent. There are various possible reasons for 
this. Consider the famous Kelo vs. New London case, in which Suzette Kelo’s Connecticut home 
was taken without consent for a private development project. Ostensibly, the land was more 
valuable to a private developer than it was to Kelo, but a win-win voluntary trade did not occur. 
Rather, the city government intervened using the power of eminent domain to force a sale in the 
interests of what planners thought would be a Kaldor-Hicks improvement to welfare. 
Kelo might have been holding out selling for strategic motives, or she may have other 
reasons that the standard economic evaluation of compensation cannot address. For example, she 
may value the house more than its market value for sentimental reasons or she may have made 
commitments (e.g., a promise to keep the house in the family [White 2009]). James Buchanan 
doubts that cost-benefit calculations based on coercion can be meaningful, because opportunity 
costs cannot be measured as Kelo herself would subjectively assess them. Any estimates of 
efficiency gains from coercion “must remain almost wholly arbitrary” (Buchanan 1999, para. 
6.5.4). Despite the uproar over this case, one can at least argue that Kelo enjoyed the right of 
appeal to a higher court, with presumably fair judges; Kelo lost that appeal, 5–4, at the U.S. 
Supreme Court in 2005. 
Textbooks and Kaldor-Hicks 
With few exceptions, however, textbooks glide into discussing public policy as if the Pareto 
efficiency standard applies. That is, students are taught that efficiency means Pareto efficiency, 
but then given examples of public policies that would clearly entail involuntary harm to some. 
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Out of the eight textbooks examined in table 1, none explicitly mentioned Kaldor-Hicks by 
name, but two texts discuss the idea behind it. Case, Fair, and Oster note that: 
If some gain and some lose as the result of a change, and it can be demonstrated that the 
value of the gains exceeds the value of the losses, then the exchange is said to be 
potentially efficient. In practice, however, the distinction between a potentially and an 
actually efficient change is often ignored and all such changes are simply called efficient 
(2012, 258). 
This may well be a common practice among instructors—ignoring coercion entirely or through 
omission, pretending that outcomes are the same regardless of whether compensation is paid or 
not. Mankiw, for example, states without reservation or qualification that “Trade can make 
everyone better off” (2012, 10, emphasis added). He is clearly thinking about Pareto optimal 
voluntary trade between individuals, but immediately applies the concept to the study of 
international trade. This is bait and switch, in terms of moral arguments. He draws a normative 
conclusion relying on the Pareto standard, which is not the relevant efficiency measure to apply 
when assessing policies that involve losers. Kaldor-Hicks is the proper standard in this case, and 
calls on an analysis of normative dimensions that are contextual and require discussion and 
debate. 
Krugman and Wells, by contrast, state that “There are gains from trade,” which is subtler 
and does not assert that the effects of trade are all positive or that the gains exceed the losses 
(2012, 12). When Cowen and Tabarrok discuss the merits of trade intervention, they query the 
student and draw on critical thinking about ethics: “Is a sugar quota a good policy? That depends 
on what we think is good and who we think counts most when we measure benefits and costs.” 
And, they continue, “economics has limitations and you need to know what they are. It helps to 
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know which ethical values are left out of economic theory” (2010, 366). Cowen and Tabarrok 
also provide an institutional emphasis, noting that good institutions are needed to align self-
interest with social interest (2010, 2). This gets to the heart of the difference between Pareto 
efficiency and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency; these authors also provide a short chapter on ethical 
theory. 
In the textbooks reviewed in table 1, five out of the eight at least partially considered 
non-consequentialist considerations, and three did not. Generally, however, Sen’s critique seems 
relevant: “The violation or fulfillment of basic liberties or rights tends to be ignored in traditional 
utilitarian welfare economics…. [N]o direct and basic importance is attached in the utilitarian 
framework to rights and liberties in the evaluation of states of affairs” (1995, 2). 
NON-CONSEQUENTIALIST CONSIDERATIONS 
We have already noted that the ethical justification for Kaldor-Hicks relies not just on outcomes, 
but on institutional rules and processes. The shift from outcome-based ethics to rule-and-duty-
based ethics needs elaboration. A quick example suffices: One popular sports slogan says, 
“Winning isn’t everything—it’s the only thing.” By this measure, the final score is the sole 
measure of success. But outcomes are not the only thing that matters, or that motivates peoples’ 
actions. If outcomes were the only thing that mattered, everyone would be an opportunistic thief, 
stealing whatever they desire whenever the coast is clear. Judges would sell their decisions and 
police would always take bribes if they thought they could get away with it (Arrow 1972, 357). 
If this statement rings hollow, then the non-consequentialist, duty-based view bears 
consideration. As White notes, “People ignore their preferences, or sacrifice their wellbeing, for 
principles every day” (2009, 57). 
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A counter-slogan thus says, “It’s not whether you win or lose, it’s how you played the 
game.” Referees try to make the outcome defensible by enforcing rules, and the rules impose 
duties or obligations on players who often act on the basis of such principles. Milton Friedman 
demonstrates the concern for principles and duty when he exhorts corporate leaders to maximize 
profits on behalf of shareholders (Calkins and Wight 2008). In the right circumstances, profit-
maximization leads to efficient resource allocations in competitive markets. But CEOs, who have 
better information than the firm’s owners, can manipulate short-term earnings so as to receive 
higher bonuses, or can make extravagant corporate charity donations so as to win public acclaim 
(the so-called “principal-agent problem”). Friedman argues that CEOs have a fiduciary duty not 
to act out of their own self-interests but out of obligation or duty to shareholders. Friedman’s 
defense of market outcomes relies on individuals following non-consequentialist ethics. 
Aside from the Ten Commandments, the strongest philosophical principles for duty 
ethics come from Immanuel Kant and his categorical imperatives: first, to not make an exception 
of yourself (your actions should be universalizable), and second, to treat all others not merely as 
means to your ends, but as ends in themselves. In this light, the Pareto test for efficiency relies 
on Kantian ethics to the extent that it endorses no particular outcome, but rather supports the 
process by which individuals are allowed to voluntarily trade. This process treats individuals as 
autonomous moral agents who are granted equal dignity with every other and whose choices are 
not second-guessed. Pareto optimality is grounded in the categorical imperative to treat 
economic agents with respect. Likewise, institutions of justice that buttress the market must be 
populated with people who adhere to duty ethics, leading Arrow to argue that for the price 
system to work well, a parallel Kantian system is needed to “supplement” it: 
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The price system is not, and perhaps in some basic sense cannot be, universal. To the 
extent that it is incomplete, it must be supplemented by an implicit or explicit social 
contract. Thus one might loosely say that the categorical imperative and the price system 
are essential complements (1972, 347). 
But why should any CEO obey the call to put shareholder interests first? The 
indispensable need for self-restraint or commitment to duty is notably lacking in neoclassical 
economics. Adam Smith, however, devoted his first book, The Theory of Moral Sentiments 
(1759/1982), to deriving a model to explain how and why economic agents can also be moral 
agents, that is, who in appropriate circumstances constrain their own gains so as to fulfil 
obligations to others. Self-interest is embedded within a social and moral framework, and 
individuals learn over time what is appropriate. Self-control that is internally derived by learned 
principles (not based on external rewards) leads to a grounding in virtue-ethics. Ambition and 
striving are commendable, within the scope of one’s obligations to others.3 
The relevance of Smith’s virtue ethics should be clear. Kaldor-Hicks can be justified only 
by the existence of appropriate institutions. But for rules of justice, or government, or academic 
science to work well, individuals who enforce the rules must themselves abide by non-
consequentialist duty ethics, upheld by individual virtue. In justifying Kaldor-Hicks, it is not 
enough to have appropriate institutions on paper if the people who enforce the rules are corrupt. 
Given the spurt of research on and popularity of Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS) 
(1759/1982) over the past two decades, teachers and students should be aware that the “invisible 
hand” of the market is not synonymous with “greed is good,” because economic actors bring 
self-control to their behaviors, not simply from a consideration of outcomes, but from principles 
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of virtue and duty (Wight 2007). Only one of the eight textbooks reviewed in table 1 mentioned 
TMS as a foundation for understanding the workings of markets or the invisible hand. 
If students are to be trained as policy advisers, they should be above suspicion that their 
recommendations are tainted by personal interests, for ethical duties also apply to economists. 
Two recent texts highlight the relevant issues, DeMartino and McCloskey’s The Handbook of 
Professional Economic Ethics (2016) and DeMartino’s The Economist’s Oath: On the Need for 
and Content of Professional Economic Ethics (2011). Another way of saying this is, normative 
issues arise in the study of positive economics, and vice versa, leading Samuelson to declare that 
“the distinction between is and ought, between objective and subjective issues, [is] at bottom a 
matter of degree rather than kind….”(1976, 633). 
This line of inquiry leaves us with David Colander’s longstanding complaint that the 
positive-normative split is an artificial construct that gets in the way of thinking seriously about 
policy (Colander 1992).  The “art” of doing applied economics involves a third category, not 
purely scientific, not purely normative, but a careful blending of ideas needed for crafting policy 
solutions. The insights from positive analysis, along with the judgments or goals from normative 
theory, come together in the formulation of nuanced policy options. Such a political economy 
approach has a long tradition in economics (Colander and Su 2015) and provides a framework 
for resolving issues raised in this article about institutions and the use of the Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency standard. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In the 18th century three Enlightenment philosophers provided us with differing moral 
frameworks of analysis. Jeremy Bentham proposed outcome-based utilitarianism, Immanuel 
Kant proposed duty-based ethics, and Adam Smith proposed virtue-based ethics. In this article, I 
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have sought to demonstrate that while economists generally work in the realm of outcome-based 
ethical analysis, it is not easy to make sharp distinctions. In particular, Pareto efficiency relies on 
a moral claim to treat people with respect, and allows them autonomy to make their own choices. 
This sounds a lot like Kantian ethics, although some Kantians might disagree (White 2009). 
I also demonstrate that the moral defense of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency relies on the 
existence of appropriate institutions and people to enforce the rules who adhere to duty and 
virtue ethics. The defense of efficiency thus involves a pluralist approach, considering the 
relevance of all three ethical frameworks: a particular policy promises to produce desirable 
outcomes (e.g., increase the economic surplus), and those who are harmed by the policy have 
institutional rights that protect their interests, and those entrusted with overseeing these 
institutions will enforce the rules with only minor prejudice or corruption. 
Exploring the normative foundations of efficiency offers the promise of enhancing 
critical thinking. Public policy issues traverse the boundaries of academic disciplines and raise 
important ethical questions. If economists maintain that efficiency is simply a “fact” instead of as 
an evaluative construct, it creates intellectual blinders for students doing public policy work. 
Well-trained students in economics “should be able to scrutinize the moral underpinnings of a 
policy statement,” which is not possible if they believe that efficiency is simply the technical 
procedure of adding up numbers (Atkinson 2001, 204). Amartya Sen, who led the resurgence of 
interest in ethics in economics, argues that “An economic analyst ultimately has to juggle many 
balls, even if a little clumsily, rather than giving a superb display of virtuosity with one little ball 
[e.g., efficiency]” (cited in Klamer 1989, 141). 
The main point of this article is that the attempt to present economics as a settled 
science—rather than as a robust, changing, controversial, and exciting conversation that includes 
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moral analysis—is a disservice to students. It is not necessary that students be treated as 
incapable of dealing with nuance and ambiguity. Paul Samuelson’s Economics textbook was a 
best-seller for decades. When discussing the impacts of government intervention, Samuelson 
notes, “Naturally, all this is a controversial area. There is no one answer….” (1976, 399). The 
conclusion drawn is that: 
The reader is warned that all the above issues of welfare economics can be given varying 
interpretations and can lead to controversial debate which cannot be presumed to be 
settleable within positive science…. Economic science arms one for the great debate; it 
does not preclude that debate or prejudice its conclusions” (Samuelson 1976, 635). 
Colander, mentioned earlier, supports this caution and notes that “the art of economics is 
contextual and as much dependent on non-economic political, social, institutional, and historical 
judgments as it is on economics.” Once this is made clear to students, many controversial 
disagreements (e.g., about the desirability of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Treaty) are seen to 
“result primarily from different judgments about political and social dimensions of policy 
implementation, not about differences in underlying theory” (1992, 197). 
The political economy approach involves the careful study and joining of positive with 
normative elements to make policy suggestions. If this were implemented, what teachers would 
address with students about policy matters would be richer in terms of context, clearer in terms 
of normative values, and humbler in terms of final prescriptions. The claim is that this better 




1 This claim may be too stringent, but its virtue is that it would force policy analysts and students 
to consider multiple outcomes. 
2 It is important to point out that only adult males were allowed to sign the agreement, and adult 
women and some adult servants did not participate. Would such a compact with unequal 
participation be considered ethically defensible today? 
3 Hence, an entrepreneur “…may run as hard as he can, and strain every nerve and every muscle, 
in order to outstrip all his competitors. But if he should justle, or throw down any of them, the 
indulgence of the spectators is entirely at an end. It is a violation of fair play, which they cannot 
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Baumol and Blinder, 13th ed. Positive Yes No Partial No 
Case, Fair, and Oster, 10th ed. Normative Yes Yes No No 
Colander, 10th ed. Normative Yes* Yes Yes Yes 
Cowen and Tabarrok, 1st ed. Mixed Yes No Yes Rawls No 
Hubbard and O’Brien, 4th ed. Positive Yes No No No 
Krugman and Wells, 3rd ed. Positive Yes No Partial No 
Mankiw, 6th ed. Positive Yes No No No 
Parkin, 11th ed. Positive Yes No Yes: Rule-based No 
 
Notes: Outliers shown in bold. *See text. 
